唧唧堂：MS 管理科学2022年1月刊论文摘要38篇

现实世界中的许多分析问题都会涉及两个重大挑战:预测和优化。由于每个挑战都具有典型的复杂性，因而解决相关问题的标准范式是先预测后优化。而对于机器学习，总的来说，其目的是最小化预测误差，而不考虑如何在下游优化问题中使用预测。相反，我们提出了一个新的、非常通用的框架，称为智能“预测，然后优化”(SPO)。该框架直接利用优化问题结构——即其目标和约束——来设计更好的预测模型。我们框架的一个关键组成部分是SPO损失函数，该函数衡量了由预测引起的决策错误。由于训练一个关于SPO损失的预测模型在计算上的挑战性，我们使用对偶理论推导出一个凸代理损失函数，并称之为SPO+损失。最重要的是，我们证明了在适当条件下，SPO+损失与SPO损失在统计意义上是一致的。我们的SPO+损失函数可以跟踪处理任何带有线性目标的多面体优化、凸优化、甚至混合整数优化问题。对最短路径和投资组合优化问题的数值实验发现SPO框架可以在先预测后优化范式下带来显著的改进，特别是当被训练的预测模型被错误指定时。我们发现，即使真实数据是高度非线性的，使用SPO+损失训练的线性模型也倾向于占优随机森林算法。

Many real-world analytics problems involve two significant challenges: prediction and optimization. Because of the typically complex nature of each challenge, the standard paradigm is predict-then-optimize. By and large, machine learning tools are intended to minimize prediction error and do not account for how the predictions will be used in the downstream optimization problem. In contrast, we propose a new and very general framework, called Smart “Predict, then Optimize” (SPO), which directly leverages the optimization problem structure—that is, its objective and constraints—for designing better prediction models. A key component of our framework is the SPO loss function, which measures the decision error induced by a prediction. Training a prediction model with respect to the SPO loss is computationally challenging, and, thus, we derive, using duality theory, a convex surrogate loss function, which we call the SPO+ loss. Most importantly, we prove that the SPO+ loss is statistically consistent with respect to the SPO loss under mild conditions. Our SPO+ loss function can tractably handle any polyhedral, convex, or even mixed-integer optimization problem with a linear objective. Numerical experiments on shortest-path and portfolio-optimization problems show that the SPO framework can lead to significant improvement under the predict-then-optimize paradigm, in particular, when the prediction model being trained is misspecified. We find that linear models trained using SPO+ loss tend to dominate random-forest algorithms, even when the ground truth is highly nonlinear.

参考文献：Adam N. Elmachtoub, Paul Grigas. Smart “Predict, then Optimize”. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 9–26.

2、零售店中的议价：基于维也纳的研究

在西方，标价是正常现象，很少看到消费者收到低于标价的折扣。然而，我们发现，当询问商店时，大约40%的时间会给予10%的折扣。对于高价产品和非销售产品，小型企业更有可能提供折扣。更普遍的是，不同企业类型的价格授权行为的差异可表明监控成本和员工技能是议价行为的重要驱动因素。

In the West, where posted prices are the norm, it is uncommon to observe consumers receive discounts below the posted price. Nevertheless, we find that when stores are asked, a discount is granted approximately 40% of the time, with a median discount percentage of 10%. Discounts are more likely to be offered by small-scale firms, for higher-priced products, and for nonsale items. More generally, differences in price delegation behavior across firm types serve as an indicator that monitoring costs and employee skills are important drivers of bargaining behavior.

参考文献：Sandro Shelegia, Joshua Sherman. Bargaining at Retail Stores: Evidence from Vienna. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 27–36.

3、创新的新颖性:竞争、颠覆和反垄断政策

我们设计了一个模型来分析创新的新颖性，并探索它对市场竞争性质和创新质量的意义。一个创新者不仅要决定是否创新，还要决定如何大胆创新，其中，创新的地方越新奇——与之前的越不同——结果就越不确定。我们指出，在这种环境下存在阿罗替代效应的一种变体，即新进入者比现有者追求更多的创新技术。尽管如此，我们的研究表明，新进入者扰乱现有者的可能性比现有者扰乱自身的可能性要小，而且在市场中失败的可能性也更小。通过模型扩展，我们允许现有者获得进入者的创新，并指出这逆转了阿罗效应。由于进入者寻求对现有者的价值最大化，使得收购的前景对创新更有利可图，但同时也抑制了创新的新颖性。这种逆转表明，严格的反垄断政策对激励创业企业大胆创新具有积极作用。

We develop a model to capture the novelty of innovation and explore what it means for the nature of market competition and quality of innovations. An innovator decides not only whether to innovate but how boldly to innovate, where the more novel is the innovation—the more different it is from what has come before—the more uncertain is the outcome. We show in this environment that a variant of the Arrow replacement effect holds in that new entrants pursue more innovative technologies than do incumbents. Despite this, we show that the new entrant is less likely to disrupt an incumbent than the incumbent is to disrupt itself, and less likely to fail in the market. We extend the model to allow the incumbent to acquire the entrant postinnovation and show that this reverses the Arrow effect. The prospect of acquisition makes innovation more profitable but simultaneously suppresses the novelty of innovation as the entrant seeks to maximize her value to the incumbent. This reversal suggests a positive role for a strict antitrust policy that spurs entrepreneurial firms to innovate boldly.

参考文献：Steven Callander, Niko Matouschek. The Novelty of Innovation: Competition, Disruption, and Antitrust Policy. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 37–51.

4、资产价格的昂贵解释

我们提出了一个模型，在这个模型中，投资者不能毫无成本地处理资产价格的信息。在交易阶段，投资者是有限理性的，他们对价格的解释会给价格注入噪声，因而会引发内生的噪声交易。我们的设置预测了价格惯性和得到了过度的回报波动和过度的交易量。在整体均衡中，投资者通过权衡优于市场的利益与获得复杂性的成本来选择复杂性水平。由于复杂收购可能存在战略互补，进而导致多重均衡的结果。

We propose a model in which investors cannot costlessly process information from asset prices. At the trading stage, investors are boundedly rational, and their interpretation of prices injects noise into the price, generating a source of endogenous noise trading. Our setup predicts price momentum and yields excessive return volatility and excessive trading volume. In an overall equilibrium, investors optimally choose sophistication levels by balancing the benefit of beating the market against the cost of acquiring sophistication. There can exist strategic complementarity in sophistication acquisition, leading to multiple equilibria.

参考文献：Jordi Mondria, Xavier Vives, Liyan Yang. Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 52–74.

5、社交网络中网红营销的分析架构：对网红的选择与调度

各种社交媒体平台上用户数量的爆炸性增长已经改变了企业制定营销活动战略的方式。为了利用庞大的社交网络，企业已将注意力转向网红营销，他们聘请独立的网红在社交媒体平台上推广他们的产品。尽管最近网红营销有所增长，但网络播种问题(即确定网红以最佳方式发布企业信息或广告)既没有在学术文献中得到严格研究，也没有在实践中得以解决。我们设计了一个数据驱动的优化框架，以实现企业的利益最大化，分别设计了两个模型，以帮助企业成功地进行(i)短期和(ii)长期网红营销活动。模型基于与营销人员的互动以及对企业在社交媒体信息的观察，并通过对Twitter数据进行实证分析对模型参数进行估计。我们的实证分析发现了多网红的集体影响效应，并发现模型中包含了两个重要参数，即多重暴露效应和遗忘效应。对于短期活动，我们设计了一个优化模型来选择网红并给出模型的结构特性。利用这些性质，我们提出了一个基于多项式时间的数学规划模型，以提供接近最优的解决方案。对于长期问题，我们设计了一个有效的解决方法，以实现同时选择网红并在规划期内安排他们的消息发布。通过与实践中使用的多个基准测试方法对比，我们展示了我们的解决策略在短期和长期问题上的优越性。最后，我们为处在网红营销的背景下的企业提供了一些管理启示。

Explosive growth in the number of users on various social media platforms has transformed the way firms strategize their marketing activities. To take advantage of the vast size of social networks, firms have now turned their attention to influencer marketing wherein they employ independent influencers to promote their products on social media platforms. Despite the recent growth in influencer marketing, the problem of network seeding (i.e., identification of influencers to optimally post a firm’s message or advertisement) neither has been rigorously studied in the academic literature nor has been carefully addressed in practice. We develop a data-driven optimization framework to help a firm successfully conduct (i) short-horizon and (ii) long-horizon influencer marketing campaigns, for which two models are developed, respectively, to maximize the firm’s benefit. The models are based on the interactions with marketers, observation of firms’ message placements on social media, and model parameters estimated via empirical analysis performed on data from Twitter. Our empirical analysis discovers the effects of collective influence of multiple influencers and finds two important parameters to be included in the models, namely, multiple exposure effect and forgetting effect. For the short-horizon campaign, we develop an optimization model to select influencers and present structural properties for the model. Using these properties, we develop a mathematical programming based polynomial time procedure to provide near-optimal solutions. For the long-horizon problem, we develop an efficient solution procedure to simultaneously select influencers and schedule their message postings over a planning horizon. We demonstrate the superiority of our solution strategies for both short- and long-horizon problems against multiple benchmark methods used in practice. Finally, we present several managerially relevant insights for firms in the influencer marketing context.

参考文献：Rakesh R. Mallipeddi, Subodha Kumar, Chelliah Sriskandarajah, Yunxia Zhu. A Framework for Analyzing Influencer Marketing in Social Networks: Selection and Scheduling of Influencers. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), :75–104.

6、云定价:现货市场反击

云计算提供商必须经常持有许多可用的空闲计算容量(例如，用于维护或为具有长期合同的用户提供服务)。一个自然的想法是在二级市场上（例如通过可抢占的现货市场）出售这些闲置计算容量。直观地看，这应该会增加提供商的利润。然而，这忽略了可能发生在均衡状态下的“市场蚕食”效应，以及供应商因抢占而承受的额外成本。为了研究提供现货市场的可行性，我们将排队理论和博弈论相结合，对供应商利润优化问题进行模型，以分析由此产生的排队系统的均衡。我们的主要研究结果是，在一个易于检查的条件下，供应商可以通过提供现货市场(使用闲置资源)和固定价格市场，同时实现利润增长和为用户创造帕累托改进。最后，通过数值实验，我们分析了提供者的成本及其策略对其利润的影响。

Cloud computing providers must constantly hold many idle compute instances available (e.g., for maintenance or for users with long-term contracts). A natural idea, which should intuitively increase the provider’s profit, is to sell these idle instances on a secondary market, for example, via a preemptible spot market. However, this ignores possible “market cannibalization” effects that may occur in equilibrium as well as the additional costs the provider experiences due to preemptions. To study the viability of offering a spot market, we model the provider’s profit optimization problem by combining queuing theory and game theory to analyze the equilibria of the resulting queuing system. Our main result is an easy-to-check condition under which a provider can simultaneously achieve a profit increase and create a Pareto improvement for the users by offering a spot market (using idle resources) alongside a fixed-price market. Finally, we illustrate our results numerically to demonstrate the effects that the provider’s costs and her strategy have on her profit.

参考文献：Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken. Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 205-122..

7、司机、乘客和服务提供商:共享经济对出行的影响 （需要重新修改翻译）

人们普遍认为，拼车（即在一次旅程中多人乘坐同一辆车的出行方式），通过更高效地利用汽车座位，有可能显著减少交通量。我们介绍了一种模式，在此模式下，乘客向拼车平台支付一定的费用，随后平台将费用支付给司机。我们将集体决策建模为匿名非原子博弈，其中不仅考虑了有限的策略集，还考虑了收入异质个体的收益函数。我们研究了如何组织拼车，以及拼车平台的引入如何影响交通和所有权，其中平台通过选择座位出租价格以最大化收入或福利。我们发现，拥有与使用成本的比率决定了拼车的组织方式。如果这一比例较低，拼车就会以点对点(P2P)服务的形式提供;如果这一比例较高，拼车就会以企业对客户(B2C)服务的形式提供。在P2P的情况下，只有当司机需要满足自己的交通需求时，才会由司机发起搭车。在B2C的情况下，即使并非出于专职司机的个人需求，汽车也需要一直由专职司机驾驶。我们表明，尽管拼车的引入可能会降低汽车拥有率，但它可以导致交通流量的增加。我们的研究结果还表明，随着拥有成本的增加，交通流量和拥有率可能会增加，而一个收益最大化的平台可能更倾向于使汽车只占用几个座位，从而导致高交通流量。我们将这些结果与社会福利最大化平台的结果进行了对比。

It is widely believed that ride sharing, the practice of sharing a car such that more than one person travels in the car during a journey, has the potential to significantly reduce traffic by filling up cars more efficiently. We introduce a model in which individuals may share rides for a certain fee, paid by the rider(s) to the driver through a ride-sharing platform. Collective decision making is modeled as an anonymous nonatomic game with a finite set of strategies and payoff functions among individuals who are heterogeneous in their income. We examine how ride sharing is organized and how traffic and ownership are affected if a platform, which chooses the seat rental price to maximize either revenue or welfare, is introduced to a population. We find that the ratio of ownership to usage costs determines how ride sharing is organized. If this ratio is low, ride sharing is offered as a peer-to-peer (P2P) service, and if this ratio is high, ride sharing is offered as a business-to-customer (B2C) service. In the P2P case, rides are initiated by drivers only when the drivers need to fulfill their own transportation requirements. In the B2C case, cars are driven all the time by full-time drivers taking rides even if these are not motivated by their private needs. We show that, although the introduction of ride sharing may reduce car ownership, it can lead to an increase in traffic. We also show that traffic and ownership may increase as the ownership cost increases and that a revenue-maximizing platform might prefer a situation in which cars are driven with only a few seats occupied, causing high traffic. We contrast these results with those obtained for a social welfare-maximizing platform.

参考文献：Saif Benjaafar, Harald Bernhard, Costas Courcoubetis, Michail Kanakakis, Spyridon Papafragkos. Drivers, Riders, and Service Providers: The Impact of the Sharing Economy on Mobility. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 123–142.

8、低工资工人和非竞争性协议可执行性

我们利用2008年俄勒冈州针对计时工资工人的非竞争性协议(NCAs)，为揭示NCAs对低薪工人的影响提供了第一手证据。我们发现，对小时工禁用NCA平均提高了2%-3%的小时工资。由于只有一部分工人签署了NCA，所以我们通过按小时计酬人群中使用NCA的普遍程度衡量该估计值，结果表明，尽管存在于不受NCA约束的劳动力市场的溢出效应会降低真正的估计效果，但是实际上受NCA约束的员工仍可能高达14% -21%。虽然在年龄、教育和工资分配中均发现了工资的积极影响，但在女性工作者和NCAs更常见的职业中，这种影响更强。俄勒冈州的低工资NCA禁令还改善了俄勒冈州的平均职业状况，提高了工作之间的流动性，并在不影响工作时间的情况下提高了有薪工人的比例。

We exploit the 2008 Oregon ban on noncompete agreements (NCAs) for hourly-paid workers to provide the first evidence on the impact of NCAs on low-wage workers. We find that banning NCAs for hourly workers increased hourly wages by 2%–3% on average. Since only a subset of workers sign NCAs, scaling this estimate by the prevalence of NCA use in the hourly-paid population suggests that the effect on employees actually bound by NCAs may be as great as 14%–21%, though the true effect is likely lower due to labor market spillovers onto those not bound by NCAs. Whereas the positive wage effects are found across the age, education, and wage distributions, they are stronger for female workers and in occupations where NCAs are more common. The Oregon low-wage NCA ban also improved average occupational status in Oregon, raised job-to-job mobility, and increased the proportion of salaried workers without affecting hours worked.

参考文献：Sareh Nabi, Houssam Nassif, Joseph Hong, Hamed Mamani, Guido Imbens. Low-Wage Workers and the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 143–170.

9、基于优先级的最优分配机制

本文提出一种易于设计最优优先系统的方法。该系统在考虑代理选择行为的同时，可以将代理分配到异质的项目中。我们从延期验收和最优交易周期等特殊情况优化相应的机制。与之前的文献不同，我将机制中的这些输入，即代理的优先分配和项目的配额，作为待优化的参数。该方法基于采用收益管理方法分析单边匹配的大型市场模型，用以解决以社会福利为目标的一类分类规划问题。我将这一方法应用于学校选择问题，并表明限制选择可能有利于学生。此外，我计算了波士顿地区小学选择的优化选择集和优先级。

This paper develops a tractable methodology for designing an optimal priority system for assigning agents to heterogeneous items while accounting for agents’ choice behavior. The space of mechanisms being optimized includes deferred acceptance and top trading cycles as special cases. In contrast to previous literature, I treat the inputs to these mechanisms, namely the priority distribution of agents and quotas of items, as parameters to be optimized. The methodology is based on analyzing large market models of one-sided matching using techniques from revenue management and solving a certain assortment planning problem whose objective is social welfare. I apply the methodology to school choice and show that restricting choices may be beneficial to student welfare. Moreover, I compute optimized choice sets and priorities for elementary school choice in Boston.

参考文献：Peng Shi. Optimal Priority-Based Allocation Mechanisms. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 171–188.

10、远大前景：融合计量经济学与分析学以提高对电影成功的预测

关于机器学习和整合社交媒体数据能够在多大程度上提高商业应用的预测准确性，存在着大量的炒作。为了评估这种炒作是否有必要，我们在仿真实验中采用了来自电影行业的数据，并与计量经济学方法和预测分析文献中的工具进行了对比。此外，我们提出了新的策略，这些策略结合了每个文献中的元素，试图在控制收入的潜在关系中捕捉更丰富的异质性模式。我们的结果证实了社交媒体数据的重要性，以及在使用新的大数据源进行预测时，结合计量经济学和机器学习的混合策略的价值。具体来说，尽管最小二乘支持向量回归和递归划分策略在预测精度方面都大大优于降维策略和传统计量经济学方法，但使用混合方法还可以获得更大的收益。此外，我们通过蒙特卡洛实验证明，社交媒体对票房结果的度量和其他电影特征对票房结果的影响具有显著的异质性，并因而导致了上述收益。

There exists significant hype regarding how much machine learning and incorporating social media data can improve forecast accuracy in commercial applications. To assess if the hype is warranted, we use data from the film industry in simulation experiments that contrast econometric approaches with tools from the predictive analytics literature. Further, we propose new strategies that combine elements from each literature in a bid to capture richer patterns of heterogeneity in the underlying relationship governing revenue. Our results demonstrate the importance of social media data and value from hybrid strategies that combine econometrics and machine learning when conducting forecasts with new big data sources. Specifically, although both least squares support vector regression and recursive partitioning strategies greatly outperform dimension reduction strategies and traditional econometrics approaches in forecast accuracy, there are further significant gains from using hybrid approaches. Further, Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate that these benefits arise from the significant heterogeneity in how social media measures and other film characteristics influence box office outcomes.

参考文献：Steven F. Lehrer, Tian Xie. The Bigger Picture: Combining Econometrics with Analytics Improves Forecasts of Movie Success. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 189–210.

11、中层管理人员、人员流动和绩效:零售连锁店的长期实地实验

在一项随机对照试验中，一家大型零售连锁店的首席执行官(CEO)为被试商店的经理们设定了新的目标，要求他们“尽其所能”降低员工离职率。这种实验将离职率降低了五分之一到四分之一，并持续了9个月才逐渐消失，但在提醒后又重新出现。并且这一实验设置对销售额没有影响。进一步的分析表明，被试门店经理在人力资源上花费的时间更多，在客户服务上花费的时间更少。我们的研究结果表明，中层管理者有助于减少人员流动，但他们在资源有限且多任务的条件下，面临着将资源投入到不同活动之间的权衡。虽然，本文中的实验确实提高了效率，但是这些只发生在企业这一层面。

In a randomized controlled trial, a large retail chain’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) sets new goals for the managers of the treated stores by asking them to “do what they can” to reduce the employee quit rate. The treatment decreases the quit rate by a fifth to a quarter, lasting nine months before petering out, but reappearing after a reminder. There is no treatment effect on sales. Further analysis reveals that treated store managers spend more time on human resources (HR) and less on customer service. Our findings show that middle managers are instrumental in reducing personnel turnover, but they face a trade-off between investing in different activities in a multitasking environment with limited resources. The treatment does produce efficiency gains. However, these occur only at the firm level.

参考文献：Guido Friebel, Matthias Heinz, Nikolay Zubanov. Middle Managers, Personnel Turnover, and Performance: A Long‐Term Field Experiment in a Retail Chain. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 211–229.

12、团队激励、社会凝聚力与绩效:一个自然的实地实验

我们在荷兰的122家零售连锁店开展了实地实验，以研究团队激励、团队社会凝聚力和团队绩效之间的相互作用。理论上，我们预测由于社会凝聚力减少了搭便车行为，因而团队激励对团队绩效的影响会随着团队的社会凝聚力而增加。此外，团队激励可能会导致更多的同事支持或更高的同伴压力，从而影响团队的社会凝聚力。在干预前后，我们在随机选择的商店子集中引入了短期团队激励，并对所有商店进行了度量，包括包括团队的销售业绩、团队的社会凝聚力、同事支持和同伴压力。团队激励对销售的平均实验效果为1.5个百分点，与0没有显著差异。与理论相一致，干预前测量的实验效果估计值随着社会凝聚力的增加而增加。此外，社会凝聚力本身不受团队激励的影响。

We conducted a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain of 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance increases with the team’s social cohesion because social cohesion reduces free-riding behavior. In addition, team incentives may lead to more coworker support or to higher peer pressure and thereby, can affect the team’s social cohesion. We introduced short-term team incentives in a randomly selected subset of stores and measured for all stores, both before and after the intervention, the team’s sales performance and the team’s social cohesion as well as coworker support and peer pressure. The average treatment effect of the team incentive on sales is 1.5 percentage points, which does not differ significantly from zero. In line with theory, the estimated treatment effect increases with social cohesion as measured before the intervention. Social cohesion itself is not affected by the team incentives.

参考文献：Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur, Oke Onemu, Joeri Sol. Team Incentives, Social Cohesion, and Performance: A Natural Field Experiment. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 230–256.

13、新商标的价值评估

企业通常在推出新产品或服务时注册商标。我们发现，新商标注册数量对预测企业盈利能力、股票回报据和分析师在盈利预测中的反应不足有正向作用。利用《联邦商标反淡化法》(FTDA)作为商标保护的外生冲击，我们发现，更强的商标保护增强了新商标注册的可预测性。总之，本文研究结果表明，投资者低估了新商标注册的价值。

Firms often register trademarks as they launch new products or services. We find that the number of new trademark registrations positively predicts firm profitability, stock returns, and underreaction by analysts in their earnings forecasts. Using the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) as an exogenous shock to trademark protection, we find that greater trademark protection strengthens the predictability of new trademark registrations. Together, our evidence suggests that investors undervalue new trademark registrations.

参考文献：Po-Hsuan Hsu, Dongmei Li, Qin Li, Siew Hong Teoh, Kevin Tseng. Valuation of New Trademarks. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 257–279.

14、自动驾驶汽车在解决城市最后一英里配送中的价值

本文证实了与目前的送货员在配送包裹前必须停放车辆的系统相比，自动辅助配送可以带来显著改善。我们以自动驾驶汽车为研究对象，该自动驾驶汽车可以将送货员送至城市中预定的地点，随后，送货员将货物步行送至最后的收货地址。然后，车辆搭载送货人员前往下一个装货点。通过这种方式，送货员将永远不需要寻找停车位或走回停车位。基于客户数量、车辆行驶速度、送货人行走速度和装货时间，我们在由客户构成的实心矩形网格上刻画了自动驾驶情况的最优解，表明可以在多项式时间内找到该最优解。为了衡量自动驾驶案例的完成时间，我们引入了包裹配送服务的传统模型，其中包括搜索停车位的时间。结果表明，如果忽略寻找停车位的时间，引入自动驾驶汽车将完成所有客户的配送时间减少了0%-33%。在考虑停车次数非零的情况下，在更长的停车时间、更小的容量和更低的装载包裹的固定时间下，送货员节省了30%-77%的时间。

We demonstrate that autonomous-assisted delivery can yield significant improvements relative to today’s system in which a delivery person must park the vehicle before delivering packages. We model an autonomous vehicle that can drop off the delivery person at selected points in the city where the delivery person makes deliveries to the final addresses on foot. Then, the vehicle picks up the delivery person and travels to the next reloading point. In this way, the delivery person would never need to look for parking or walk back to a parking place. Based on the number of customers, driving speed of the vehicle, walking speed of the delivery person, and the time for loading packages, we characterize the optimal solution to the autonomous case on a solid rectangular grid of customers, showing the optimal solution can be found in polynomial time. To benchmark the completion time of the autonomous case, we introduce a traditional model for package delivery services that includes the time to search for parking. If the time to find parking is ignored, we show the introduction of an autonomous vehicle reduces the completion time of delivery to all customers by 0%–33%. When nonzero times to find parking are considered, the delivery person saves 30%–77% with higher values achieved for longer parking times, smaller capacities, and lower fixed time for loading packages.

参考文献：Sara Reed, Ann Melissa Campbell, Barrett W. Thomas. The Value of Autonomous Vehicles for Last-Mile Deliveries in Urban Environments. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 280–299.

15、先行动好么？早期企业的专家评价中的位置效应

关于先提出/先被评估的好处，经常有相当多的忧虑和相互矛盾的建议。因此，我们分析了专业评估者如何根据评估顺序对创业计划进行评价。以中国北京举行的一场创新基金大赛为研究背景，其中该大赛的奖金十分丰厚，评估师是准随机分配的，并在没有同行影响的情况下评估书面申请。这使我们能够可靠地恢复因果位置效应。我们还通过理论分析并测试评估者先前(情境特定)判断经验的异质性如何调节位置效应。总的来说，首先评估的提案要求排名前10%的总资产仅等同于未被先评估的位于后10%的提案的评估。企业和评估者的固定效应模型得出了一致的结论。我们将在讨论部分考虑可能缓解这些位置影响的评估设计元素。

There is often considerable anxiety and conflicting advice concerning the benefits of presenting/being evaluated first. We thus investigate how expert evaluators vary in their evaluations of entrepreneurial proposals based upon the order in which they are evaluated. Our research setting is a premiere innovation fund competition in Beijing, China, where the prize money at stake is economically meaningful, and evaluators are quasi-randomly assigned to evaluate written grant proposals without the possibility of peer influence. This enables us to credibly recover a causal position effect. We also theorize and test how heterogeneity in evaluators’ prior (context-specific) judging experience moderates position effects. Overall, we find that a proposal evaluated first requires total assets in the top 10th percentile to merely equal the evaluation of a proposal in the bottom 10th percentile that is not evaluated first. Firm and evaluator fixed-effects models yield consistent findings. We consider evaluation design elements that may mollify these position effects in the discussion section.

参考文献：Jiang Bian, Jason Greenberg, Jizhen Li, Yanbo Wang. Good to Go First? Position Effects in Expert Evaluation of Early-Stage Ventures. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 300–315.

16、客户转换成本如何决定企业范围? 来自移动通讯市场的证据

本文研究了客户转换成本变化对单一产品企业和多产品企业相对优势的影响。提供单一产品的企业可以根据客户的需求量身定制产品，而多产品企业可以以灵活的形式为客户创造价值，允许客户随着偏好的变化而改变产品种类，且不需要更换供应商。我们认为，当客户面临高转换成本时，这种价值创造机制更有效。我们利用突然降低客户转换成本的移动电信部门外生政策的变化(号码可携号转网)，，验证了这一预测。我们的结果显示，当客户转换成本下降时，多产品企业的增长低于单产品企业，并且与先前相比，提供多产品的企业进入频率有所降低。该研究强调了客户转换成本是如何促进或抑制企业范围的选择。

This paper examines the relative advantages of single-product and multiproduct firms following changes in customer switching costs. Whereas a single-product firm can closely tailor offerings to customers’ needs, a multiproduct firm can create value for customers in the form of flexibility, allowing them to change between product varieties as preferences evolve without needing to switch providers. We argue that this value-creation mechanism is more effective when customers face high switching costs and explore this prediction in the mobile telecommunications sector, using an exogenous policy change (mobile number portability) that suddenly decreases customer switching costs. Our results reveal that when customer switching costs fall, multiproduct firms see lower growth than single-product firms, and entry with a multiproduct offering becomes less frequent than before. The study highlights how customer switching costs can enable or inhibit choices of firm scope.

参考文献：Niloofar Abolfathi, Simone Santamaria, Charles Williams. How Does Firm Scope Depend on Customer Switching Costs? Evidence from Mobile Telecommunications Markets. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 316–332.

17、运用多个企业的企业家的行为与绩效:基于资源再配置视角的分析

先前的研究表明，同时经营不止一家企业的投资组合企业家比运营单一企业的企业家更能成功地创业。但是，他们的企业不太可能生存下来。为了调和这一矛盾，本文提出了一个框架，在这个框架中，运营多个企业的企业家的主要优势不是事先选择最佳商业机会的优越能力，而是事后跨业务重新部署人力和资本资源的能力。这就减少了他们在新项目上的投资。这种重新部署的选择有助于他们退出未能通过最初市场测试的新业务。因此，运营多个企业的企业家的异质性终止决策比事前商机选择更能解释新企业绩效差异。我们通过超过5700名企业家的纵向数据集测试了这些想法，并找到了一致的证据，即：运营多个企业的企业在进入时没有表现出系统性的更高绩效; 因为存在选择效应和资源重新部署，绩效差异只会随着时间的推移而出现。

Prior research suggests portfolio entrepreneurs—businesspeople who run more than one firm simultaneously—launch more successful ventures than their single-business counterparts. However, their ventures are less likely to survive. In an attempt to reconcile this paradox, this paper presents a framework in which portfolio entrepreneurs’ main advantage is not a superior ability to select the best business opportunities ex ante, but rather the ability to redeploy human and capital resources across businesses ex post, which reduces the sunkenness of their investments in new projects. This redeployment option facilitates their exit from new businesses that fail initial market tests. Thus, portfolio entrepreneurs’ heterogeneous termination decisions explain a greater portion of new firm performance differential than ex ante opportunity selection. We test these ideas using a longitudinal data set of more than 5,700 entrepreneurs and find consistent evidence. Portfolio companies do not show systematically higher performance at the time of entry; a performance difference emerges only over time, as the selection effect and resource redeployment occur.

参考文献：Simone Santamaria. Portfolio Entrepreneurs’ Behavior and Performance: A Resource Redeployment Perspective. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 333–354.

18、慈善众筹平台中项目与回归捐赠者的匹配

我们提出了一种方法，将回归的捐赠者与慈善众筹平台上的筹款活动匹配起来。该方法基于一个捐赠者效用最大化的结构性计量经济学模型，其中，捐赠者可以从捐赠中获得利他(来自他人的福利)和利己(来自个人动机)效用——即慈善捐赠的一个独特特征。我们使用donorschoose.org(最大的K-12教育众筹平台)的综合数据集来评估我们的模型。我们发现，与文献中流行的个性化推荐方法相比，所提出的模型更能准确地识别捐赠者在未来一段时间内回归时愿意捐赠的项目以及他们愿意捐赠多少。从估计模型中，我们发现，主要的利己因素诱发了超过三分之二的捐款，但在筹款活动的过程中，这两种动机发挥了共生的作用: 在项目的早期阶段，当项目的可行性还不明确时，利己主义的动机会推动资金的投入，而利他主义的动机则会在项目的后期助力实现资金目标。最后，我们考虑所有项目的需求和不同的预算和捐助者的偏好，以最大化每周的总资金为目标，利用所提出的模型设计了一个建议政策。我们估计,基于过去14周的数据,与以前相比，这样的政策使得捐款提高了2.5%,更可行的项目分得资金提升了9%，获得资助的项目增加了17%，捐赠者效用提升了15%。与直觉相反，我们发现，随着时间的推移，每周资金最大化的政策比每周总效用最大化的政策得到的捐助者的效用更高。其原因是，资金最大化政策将捐款集中在更可行的项目上，从而导致更多的资助项目，最终提升了捐助者效用。

We propose an approach to match returning donors to fundraising campaigns on philanthropic crowdfunding platforms. It is based on a structural econometric model of utility-maximizing donors who can derive both altruistic (from the welfare of others) and egoistic (from personal motivations) utilities from donating—a unique feature of philanthropic giving. We estimate our model using a comprehensive data set from DonorsChoose.org—the largest crowdfunding platform for K–12 education. We find that the proposed model more accurately identifies the projects that donors would like to donate to on their return in a future period, and how much they would donate, than popular personalized recommendation approaches in the literature. From the estimated model, we find that primarily egoistic factors motivate over two-thirds of the donations, but, over the course of the fundraising campaign, both motivations play a symbiotic role: egoistic motivations drive the funding in the early stages of a campaign when the viability of the project is still unclear, whereas altruistic motivations help reach the funding goal in the later stages. Finally, we design a recommendation policy using the proposed model to maximize the total funding each week considering the needs of all projects and the heterogeneous budgets and preferences of donors. We estimate that over the last 14 weeks of the data period, such a policy would have raised 2.5% more donation, provided 9% more funding to the projects by allocating them to more viable projects, funded 17% more projects, and provided 15% more utility to the donors from the donations than the current system. Counterintuitively, we find that the policy that maximizes total funding each week leads to higher utility for the donors over time than a policy that maximizes donors’ total utility each week. The reason is that the funding-maximizing policy focuses donations on more viable projects, leading to more funded projects, and, ultimately, higher realized donors’ utility.

参考文献：Yicheng Song, Zhuoxin Li, Nachiketa Sahoo. Matching Returning Donors to Projects on Philanthropic Crowdfunding Platforms. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 355–375.

19、在廉价谈话沟通中我们是战略上天真还是以信任和可信赖为指导?

在许多商业和经济环境中，利益冲突方之间经常进行廉价谈话的沟通。当前，存在两种截然不同的行为经济学理论，即信任嵌入模型和level-k模型，用来解释人类决策者之间的廉价谈话是如何起作用的。信任嵌入模型认为，决策者的信任和值得信赖是由非金钱动机所驱动的。相比之下，level-k模型认为决策者纯粹是自利的，但他们的战略思考能力有限。尽管两种理论在不同的背景下，都成功地解释了廉价谈话行为，但它们指出了人类行为的不同驱动因素。在本文中，我们第一次在同一背景下对这两种理论进行直接比较。结果表明，在一个充分代表了许多实际情况的闲聊环境中，这两个模型作出了特征上截然不同且经验上可区分的预测。通过来自此情景的过去的实验数据，我们确定了每个模型能够很好地捕捉到廉价谈话行为的哪些方面，以及哪个模型(或模型组合)具有更好的解释能力和预测性能。我们发现，信任嵌入模型的解释是主要的。因此，我们的研究结果强调了在系统和流程上进行投资的重要性，以促进信任和值得信赖的关系，从而促进更有效的廉价交谈互动。

Cheap-talk communication between parties with conflicting interests is common in many business and economic settings. Two distinct behavioral economics theories, the trust-embedded model and the level-k model, have emerged to explain how cheap talk works between human decision makers. The trust-embedded model considers that decision makers are motivated by nonpecuniary motives to be trusting and trustworthy. In contrast, the level-k model considers that decision makers are purely self-interested but limited in their ability to think strategically. Although both theories have been successful in explaining cheap-talk behaviors in separate contexts, they point to contrasting drivers for human behaviors. In this paper, we provide the first direct comparison of both theories within the same context. We show that, in a cheap-talk setting that well represents many practical situations, the two models make characteristically distinct and empirically distinguishable predictions. We leverage past experiment data from this setting to determine what aspects of cheap-talk behavior each model captures well and which model (or combination of models) has better explanatory power and predictive performance. We find that the trust-embedded model emerges as the dominant explanation. Our results, thus, highlight the importance of investing in systems and processes to foster trusting and trustworthy relationships in order to facilitate more effective cheap-talk interactions.

参考文献：Xiaolin Li, Özalp Özer, Upender Subramanian. Are We Strategically Naïve or Guided by Trust and Trustworthiness in Cheap-Talk Communication?. Management Science, 2022, 68(1), 376–398.

20、管理自我复制的创新产品

受自我复制3D打印机和创新农牧产品的启发，我们研究了自我复制创新产品制造商的最佳生产和销售策略，重点是独特的“保留或出售”权衡—即新生产的单位是应该出售以满足需求和刺激未来的需求，还是加入库存以增加生产能力。我们采用连续时间最优控制框架，将生产方面的自我复制模型与需求方面的典型创新-扩散模型相结合。通过分析该模型，我们确定了区分强可复制性和弱可复制性制度的条件，其中生产和销售分别优先于对方，并全面描述了它们不同的最优策略。这些见解在包括积压的需求、流动性约束、随机创新扩散、启动库存决策和外生需求等扩展中被证明是稳健和有用的。。我们还发现，社交营销策略特别适合在强复制下的自我复制的创新商品。

Inspired by self-replicating three-dimensional printers and innovative agricultural and husbandry goods, we study optimal production and sales policies for a manufacturer of self-replicating innovative goods with a focus on the unique “keep-or-sell” trade-off—namely, whether a newly produced unit should be sold to satisfy demand and stimulate future demand or added to inventory to increase production capacity. We adopt the continuous-time optimal control framework and marry a self-replication model on the production side to the canonical innovation-diffusion model on the demand side. By analyzing the model, we identify a condition that differentiates Strong and Weak Replicability regimes, wherein production and sales, respectively, take priority over the other and fully characterize their distinct optimal policies. These insights prove robust and helpful in several extensions, including backlogged demand, liquidity constraints, stochastic innovation diffusion, launch inventory decision, and exogenous demand. We also find that social marketing strategies are particularly well suited for self-replicating innovative goods under Strong Replication.

参考文献：Bin Hu, Zhankun Sun (2021) Managing Self-Replicating Innovative Goods. Management Science 68(1):399-419.

21、时间是最明智的顾问：家庭保健中医护人员与患者接触时间的价值

家庭医疗保健是美国医疗保健领域快速发展的领域。我们研究了它在向基于价值的护理转变中的作用，因为它被视为降低成本和使用昂贵的下游医疗保健服务的途径。使用关于家庭健康访问的新数据集，我们研究医护人员在对最近出院的患者进行家庭健康访问期间花费的时间是否以及如何影响患者重新入院的可能性。由于未观察到的患者健康状况可能会影响家庭健康访问的时间长度和再次入院的可能性，我们使用每个医护人员在重点访问前后30天内进行的所有其他事件的平均访问长度作为访问长度的工具。使用这种工具变量方法并控制操作、人口统计学和病人病情相关的特征，我们发现：平均而言，在重点家庭健康访问期间多出的一分钟与该访问后再次入院的可能性减少1.39%有关。我们的发现表明，就诊时间增加 10% 会使家庭健康就诊后再次入院的可能性降低 6%。我们记录了这种效应在不同患者类型和就诊类型中的异质性。我们进行的成本效益分析表明，投资于额外的家庭保健能力的成本被减少住院所带来的成本节约所抵消。

Home healthcare is a rapidly growing area of the health sector in the United States. We study its role in the shift toward value-based care, as it is viewed as an avenue for achieving reductions in the cost and utilization of expensive downstream healthcare services. Using a novel data set on home healthcare visits, we examine whether and how the amount of time that a provider spends during a home health visit with a recently discharged patient impacts the patient’s likelihood of being readmitted to the hospital. Because unobserved patient health status may influence both the length of a home health visit and the likelihood of hospital readmission, we use the within-provider average visit length of all other episodes’ visits conducted by each provider in the 30-day period before and after the focal visit as an instrument for visit length. Using this instrumental variable approach and controlling for operational, demographic, and patient condition-related characteristics, we find the following: on average, an extra minute during a focal home health visit is associated with a 1.39% decrease in the likelihood of readmission to the hospital following that visit. Our finding suggests that a 10% increase in visit length would decrease the likelihood of readmission following a home health visit by 6%. We document heterogeneity in this effect across different patient types and visit types. We conduct a cost–benefit analysis that suggests that the cost of investing in additional home health capacity is outweighed by the cost savings arising from fewer hospitalizations.

参考文献：Hummy Song, Elena Andreyeva, Guy David (2021) Time Is the Wisest Counselor of All: The Value of Provider–Patient Engagement Length in Home Healthcare. Management Science 68(1):420-441.

22、具有左位偏差的实证讨价还价模型：汽车贷款月供研究

本文研究了在处理数字时双方都存在左位偏差时的价格讨价还价问题。实证分析侧重于美国汽车金融市场，使用了 3500 万辆汽车贷款的大型数据集。在讨价还价中加入左位偏差是由几个有趣的观察结果推动的。汽车贷款的预定每月还款额以 9 美元和 0 美元结尾，尤其是超过 100 美元时。此外，9 美元期末贷款的利率较高，0 美元期末贷款利率较低。我们开发了一个纳什讨价还价模型，允许汽车经销商的消费者和财务经理都存在左位偏差。结果表明，双方都受制于这种基本的人为偏见：以9 美元和下一个以 0 美元结尾的付款额之间的感知差异大于 1 美元，尤其是以 99 美元和 00 美元结尾的付款额之间的感知差异。所提出的模型可以解释不同结尾数字的贷款的支付聚合和利率差异现象。我们使用反事实来显示左位偏差的细微影响，这可以增加和减少付款。总体而言，与没有偏见的基准案例相比，双方的偏见导致每笔贷款的平均还款额增加了 33 美元。

This paper studies price bargaining when both parties have left-digit bias when processing numbers. The empirical analysis focuses on the auto finance market in the United States, using a large data set of 35 million auto loans. Incorporating left-digit bias in bargaining is motivated by several intriguing observations. The scheduled monthly payments of auto loans bunch at both $9- and $0-ending digits, especially over $100 marks. In addition, $9-ending loans carry a higher interest rate, and $0-ending loans have a lower interest rate. We develop a Nash bargaining model that allows for left-digit bias from both consumers and finance managers of auto dealers. Results suggest that both parties are subject to this basic human bias: the perceived difference between $9- and the next $0-ending payments is larger than $1, especially between $99- and $00-ending payments. The proposed model can explain the phenomena of payments bunching and differential interest rates for loans with different ending digits. We use counterfactuals to show a nuanced impact of left-digit bias, which can both increase and decrease the payments. Overall, bias from both sides leads to a $33 increase in average payment per loan compared with a benchmark case with no bias.

参考文献：Zhenling Jiang (2021) An Empirical Bargaining Model with Left-Digit Bias: A Study on Auto Loan Monthly Payments. Management Science 68(1):442-465.

23、零售结构性投资中寻求回报

不断增长的零售结构性投资产品市场以及此类产品定价过高的经验证据，提出了私人投资者在结构性投资情境下风险偏好增强的假设。本文设计了一个基于累积前景理论的两阶段框架田野试验来验证这一假设。首先引出受试者对基础指数未来表现的预期。然后应用二分法推导20个简单的量身定制存款的确定性等价量。研究结果支持了风险偏好增加假设，揭示了研究对象在评估存款时会获得大量收益，而忽略了尾部损失事件。类似的结果也出现在后续的实验中，即用风险型存款替换不确定存款。尽管以往研究认为复杂条款的误解和乐观情绪会导致结构性工具的错误定价，但目前的实验表明，在控制预期的情况下，非标准的风险偏好表现在对简单的定义明确的产品的估值上。

The growing market for retail structured investment products and empirical evidence for excessive pricing of such products raise the hypothesis that private investors show increased risk appetite in structured investment contexts. A two-stage framed field experiment building on cumulative prospect theory is designed to test this hypothesis. Subjects’ expectations regarding the future performance of an underlying index are elicited first. A bisection algorithm is then applied to derive the certainty equivalents of 20 simple individually tailored deposits. The results support the increased risk appetite hypothesis, revealing that subjects reach for substantial gains and underweight tail loss events when evaluating the deposits. Similar results emerge in a follow-up experiment where the uncertain deposits are replaced by risky versions. While previous studies propose that misperception of complex terms and optimism contribute to the mispricing of structured instruments, the current experiments show that nonstandard risk appetite manifests in the valuation of simple well-defined products, controlling for expectations.

参考文献：Doron Sonsino, Yaron Lahav, Yefim Roth (2021) Reaching for Returns in Retail Structured Investment. Management Science 68(1):466-486.

24、人群中的隐藏专家：使用元预测来利用单问题预测问题的专业知识

现代预测算法利用群体的智慧可做出比最好的可辨识专家更好的预测。然而，当人群存在系统性偏差或在各预测者之间专业知识差异较大时，这些算法可能是不准确的。最近的研究表明，即使没有任何外部信息（如预测者过去的表现），元预测—对他人平均预测的预测—也可以用来修正偏差。我们探讨元预测是否也可以通过识别和利用预测者的专业知识来改善预测。我们开发了由Prelec、Seung和McCoy提出意外流行算法（Surprisingly Popular algorithm）的基于置信度的版本。与原算法一样，我们的新算法对偏差具有鲁棒性。然而，与原始算法不同的是，根据预测，我们的版本总是对具有更多信息量的私人信号的预测者比具有较少信息量的预测者赋予更高的权重。在一系列的实验中，我们发现改进后的算法在加权知情预测者方面比原算法做得更好，并且表明在类似的决策问题上更经常正确的个体比其他预测者对最终决策的贡献更大。实证表明，对于一组500个的决策问题，改进算法优于原算法。

Modern forecasting algorithms use the wisdom of crowds to produce forecasts better than those of the best identifiable expert. However, these algorithms may be inaccurate when crowds are systematically biased or when expertise varies substantially across forecasters. Recent work has shown that meta-predictions—a forecast of the average forecasts of others—can be used to correct for biases even when no external information, such as forecasters’ past performance, is available. We explore whether meta-predictions can also be used to improve forecasts by identifying and leveraging the expertise of forecasters. We develop a confidence-based version of the Surprisingly Popular algorithm proposed by Prelec, Seung, and McCoy. As with the original algorithm, our new algorithm is robust to bias. However, unlike the original algorithm, our version is predicted to always weight forecasters with more informative private signals more than forecasters with less informative ones. In a series of experiments, we find that the modified algorithm does a better job in weighting informed forecasters than the original algorithm and show that individuals who are correct more often on similar decision problems contribute more to the final decision than other forecasters. Empirically, the modified algorithm outperforms the original algorithm for a set of 500 decision problems.

参考文献：Tom Wilkening, Marcellin Martinie, Piers D. L. Howe (2021) Hidden Experts in the Crowd: Using Meta-Predictions to Leverage Expertise in Single-Question Prediction Problems. Management Science 68(1):487-508.

25、贷款合同菜单对借款人行为的影响

我们研究呈现给决策者的合同菜单（包括她可能无法选择的合同）如何影响她选择有回报但有风险的行动，而不是选择回报低、风险小的行动。我们通过一系列以向美国学生借款人提供的贷款还款选项为模型的实验室实验来做到这一点，在不同可用和不可用贷款还款计划菜单以及是否知道不可用选项的设置下，分析借款人的任务（职业）选择。在这些实验中，我们观察到与标准经济模型的预测不一致的行为，在标准经济模型中，代理人可以轻松做出复杂的决策，并且选择集中的每个备选方案都独立于其他潜在选项进行评估。相反，我们提供的证据表明，扩大选择菜单或让代理人意识到她被拒绝的选择会影响合同的价值。我们的实证研究结果与行为模型最为一致，这些模型允许对事后被证明为次优的选择产生预期的遗憾，或者对简单性的偏好，以及对无需做出选择的感激。

We study how the menu of contracts presented to a decision maker—including contracts she may be precluded from choosing—affects her choice of remunerative but risky actions relative to lower paying, less risky alternatives. We do this through a series of laboratory experiments modeled after the loan repayment options offered to U.S. student borrowers, analyzing borrowers’ task (career) choices in settings that vary the menu of available and unavailable loan repayment plans and knowledge of unavailable options. In these experiments, we observe behavior that is inconsistent with predictions from standard economic models in which agents can easily make complex decisions and each alternative in a choice set is evaluated independently of other potential options. Instead, we provide evidence that expanding the menu of choices or making an agent aware of choices that she has been denied can affect how a contract is valued. Our empirical findings are most consistent with behavioral models that allow for anticipated regret over a choice that turns out to be suboptimal ex post or preferences for simplicity and gratitude for being unburdened from having to make a choice.

参考文献：Katharine G. Abraham, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Y. Ozbay, Lesley J. Turner (2021) Effects of the Menu of Loan Contracts on Borrower Behavior. Management Science 68(1):509-528.

26、多重信念、支配地位和动态一致性

本文研究多重信念下的多期决策。我们探讨完全序和不完全序的动态一致性。我们关注一个支配性概念，其通过排除在一组信念中被占优的策略，支持在多种不确定性特征下的决策制定。我们揭示了两类动态不一致性的区别，我们把这种区别标记为谬误的（fallacious）和易错的（fallible）不一致性。当先验最优策略在第二阶段次优时，会出现谬误的不一致性，从而要求决策者偏离原策略。从第二期偏好的角度看，当一个先验的次优的第二期行动不再是次优的时候，就会发生易错的不一致。我们给出了动态一致性的相应定义，并证明了两类一致性对于完全序是等价的，而对于不完全序则是不同的。主观期望效用是动态一致的，而非期望效用决策规则，如minmax则不是。我们表明，对信念的支配关系介于两者之间：它不受更严重的谬误的不一致的影响，但受到问题较少的易错的不一致的影响。我们用一个数值例子说明了方法和概念，此算例解决了一个焦点的、现实的气候变化风险和模糊性问题。

This paper investigates multiperiod decisions under multiple beliefs. We explore the dynamic consistency of both complete and incomplete orderings. We focus on a dominance concept that supports decision-making under multiple characterizations of uncertainty by ruling out strategies that are dominated across a set of beliefs. We uncover a distinction between two types of dynamic inconsistency, which we label fallacious and fallible inconsistency. Fallacious inconsistency occurs when an a priori optimal strategy is suboptimal in the second period, thus requiring the decision-maker to depart from the original strategy. Fallible inconsistency occurs when an a priori suboptimal second-period action ceases being suboptimal from the perspective of the second-period preferences. We introduce corresponding definitions of dynamic consistency and show that the two types of consistency are equivalent for complete orderings, but differ for incomplete orderings. Subjective expected utility is dynamically consistent and non-expected-utility decision rules, such as minmax, are not. We show that the dominance relation over beliefs falls between these two: it is immune to the more severe fallacious inconsistency, but not to the less problematic fallible inconsistency. We illustrate the method and concepts using a numerical example addressing a focal, real-world problem of risk and ambiguity regarding climate change.

参考文献：Tommi Ekholm, Erin Baker (2021) Multiple Beliefs, Dominance and Dynamic Consistency. Management Science 68(1):529-540.

27、组合概率预测：60%和60%是60%，但可能（Likely）和可能（Likely）是非常可能（Very Likely）

我们如何结合他人的概率预测？先前的研究表明，当顾问提供数字概率预测时，人们通常会对其进行平均（即他们更接近于顾问的平均预测）。然而，如果顾问们说某个事件"可能（likely）"或"可能（probable）"发生呢？在八项研究中(n = 7，334)，我们发现，与 "计算 "数字概率相比，人们更倾向于"计算 "语言概率（即比任何单独顾问的预测更接近确定性）。例如，当顾问们都说一个事件是"可能的（likely）"时，参与者会说它是"非常可能的（very likely）"。对于高于和低于 50% 的概率、假设情景和真实事件，以及同时或依次呈现其他预测的情形下，都会出现这种影响。我们还表明，这种组合策略会延续到随后的消费者决策，这些决策依赖于顾问的可能性判断。我们讨论并排除了几种可能的作用机制。

How do we combine others’ probability forecasts? Prior research has shown that when advisors provide numeric probability forecasts, people typically average them (i.e., they move closer to the average advisor’s forecast). However, what if the advisors say that an event is “likely” or “probable?” In eight studies (n = 7,334), we find that people are more likely to act as if they “count” verbal probabilities (i.e., they move closer to certainty than any individual advisor’s forecast) than they are to “count” numeric probabilities. For example, when the advisors both say an event is “likely,” participants will say that it is “very likely.” This effect occurs for both probabilities above and below 50%, for hypothetical scenarios and real events, and when presenting the others’ forecasts simultaneously or sequentially. We also show that this combination strategy carries over to subsequent consumer decisions that rely on advisors’ likelihood judgments. We discuss and rule out several candidate mechanisms for our effect.

参考文献：Robert Mislavsky, Celia Gaertig (2021) Combining Probability Forecasts: 60% and 60% Is 60%, but Likely and Likely Is Very Likely. Management Science 68(1):541-563.

28、公共数据的私人影响：Landsat 卫星地图增加了黄金发现并鼓励进入者进入

公共数据如何影响私营部门在位者和进入者的相对绩效？运用一个简单的理论框架，我认为公开数据减少了投资不确定性，便于发现新的市场机会，增加了新进入者相对于在位者的相对市场份额。我通过估算美国国家航空航天局卫星测图计划Landsat的公共数据对黄金勘探行业在位者（资深者）和进入者（资浅者）新矿床发现率的影响，来说明这些预测。我利用各地区Landsat覆盖范围内不同的时间变化和云覆盖来确定公共数据对黄金发现模式的因果影响。我发现，在一个地区被测绘后，Landsat数据使重大黄金发现率几乎翻倍，并使新进入者的市场份额从大约10%增加到25%。公共数据似乎在驱动企业间绩效差异方面发挥着重要的作用，但研究相对较少。

How does public data shape the relative performance of incumbents and entrants in the private sector? Using a simple theoretical framework, I argue that public data reduces investment uncertainty, facilitates the discovery of new market opportunities, and increases the relative market share of new entrants relative to incumbents. I shed light on these predictions by estimating the impact of public data from Landsat, a U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration satellite mapping program, on the discovery rates of new deposits by incumbents (seniors) and entrants (juniors) in the gold exploration industry. I exploit idiosyncratic timing variation and cloud cover in Landsat coverage across regions to identify the causal effect of public data on the patterns of gold discovery. I find that Landsat data nearly doubled the rate of significant gold discoveries after a region was mapped and increased the market share of new entrants from about 10% to 25%. Public data seem to play an important, yet relatively underexplored, role in driving performance differences across firms.

参考文献：Abhishek Nagaraj (2021) The Private Impact of Public Data: Landsat Satellite Maps Increased Gold Discoveries and Encouraged Entry. Management Science 68(1):564-582.

29、从分析师反馈到自愿资本支出指导、投资效率和公司绩效的管理学习

我们检验预测：发布自愿资本支出指导的管理者从分析师反馈中学习，这种学习提高了投资效率和企业绩效。我们的发现与这些预测是一致的。首先，我们发现，经理人的资本支出调整和资本支出指导修正与分析师反馈正相关，分析师反馈通过事后指导分析师资本支出预测与经理人资本支出指导的差异来衡量。第二，投资效率变化与分析师反馈呈正相关。第三，后续公司财务绩效与经理人的资本支出调整和资本支出指导修正的预测值均呈正相关。这些发现扩展了有关管理学习和投资效率来源的先前证据，有助于解释在资本支出指导方面，管理者从相关股价效应中学习的潜力有限的情况下，管理者积极发布自愿指导。

We test predictions that managers issuing voluntary capex guidance learn from analyst feedback and that this learning enhances investment efficiency and firm performance. Our findings are consistent with these predictions. First, we find that managers’ capex adjustments and capex guidance revisions relate positively with analyst feedback measured by differences between postguidance analyst capex forecasts and managerial capex guidance. Second, changes in investment efficiency relate positively with analyst feedback. Third, subsequent firm financial performance relates positively with the predicted values of both managers’ capex adjustments and capex guidance revisions. These findings extend prior evidence regarding sources of managerial learning and investment efficiency and help to explain the active issuance of voluntary guidance by managers in settings where, as for capex guidance, the potential for managerial learning from related share price effects is limited, as we also explain.

参考文献：Jihun Bae, Gary C. Biddle, Chul W. Park (2021) Managerial Learning from Analyst Feedback to Voluntary Capex Guidance, Investment Efficiency, and Firm Performance. Management Science 68(1):583-607.

30、估值不确定性与卖空限制：来自IPO后市场的证据

我们使用首次公开募股（IPO）的设定来提供证据，证明估值不确定性和卖空限制的综合作用会导致股市的重大错误定价。我们预计在即期后市场最容易出现高价的IPO首日回报率为47%，锁定期满回报率为-9%。我们对证券借贷市场数据的详细分析证实了这些IPO经历了严重的卖空限制，在锁定期满前后最为严重。本文既解释了IPO的异常定价，又突出了估值不确定性和卖空限制在解释股权错误定价中的重要性。

We use the initial public offering (IPO) setting to provide evidence that the combination of valuation uncertainty and short-sales constraints generates significant equity market mispricing. The IPOs that we predict to be most susceptible to overpricing in the immediate aftermarket have first-day returns of +47% and lockup expiration returns of −9%. Our detailed analysis of securities lending market data confirms that these IPOs experience severe short-sales constraints that peak around the lockup expiration. Our paper both explains the anomalous pricing of IPOs and highlights the importance of valuation uncertainty and short-sales constraints in explaining equity mispricing.

参考文献：Panos N. Patatoukas, Richard G. Sloan, Annika Yu Wang (2021) Valuation Uncertainty and Short-Sales Constraints: Evidence from the IPO Aftermarket. Management Science 68(1):608-634.

31、证券市场的管道：交易后收费对交易和福利的影响

我们分析与证券市场的“管道”（即清算、结算、托管）相关的交易对手信息和成本的市场设计选择如何影响市场质量和福利。我们的模型比较了用来分配费用的两种交易后的费用结构。一种是对所有交易收取统一的费用，另一种是基于边际成本的内部化交易收取较少的费用（这两种交易者来自同一经纪人，处理成本较低）。市场设计和收费结构都会影响报价攻击性和交易量及其构成。在边际成本收费和交易对手信息可用的情况下，交易员通过报价的激进性来决定目标对手是哪个，权衡执行概率与收费。社会规划者可以通过要求基于边际成本收费，并为交易者提供披露交易对手信息的选择，实现福利最大化。

We analyze how market design choices about counterparty information and costs related to the “plumbing” (i.e., clearing, settlement, and custody) of securities markets affect market quality and welfare. Our model compares two post-trade fee structures for allocating these costs. One charges a uniform fee for all trades and the other, marginal cost–based structure a reduced fee for internalized trades (which, both traders being from the same broker, is less costly to process). Both market design and fee structure affect quote aggressiveness and trading volume and its composition. With marginal cost–based fees and counterparty information being available, traders decide which counterparties to target through quote aggressiveness, trading off execution probability against fee. A social planner can maximize welfare by requiring marginal cost–based fees and providing traders the choice to disclose counterparty information.

参考文献：Hans Degryse, Mark Van Achter, Gunther Wuyts (2021) Plumbing of Securities Markets: The Impact of Post-trade Fees on Trading and Welfare. Management Science 68(1):635-653.

32、保证理论：平衡代价高昂的正式控制与高层的语气

高层非正式语气（TATT）被广泛认为是组织控制的基本要素，但由于其柔和性，TATT的研究并没有强调数学建模。我观察到TATT引用了最高管理层设定的例子。我将TATT建模为其他等同条件下，反映了首席执行官（CEO）不会为了个人利益而转移组织资源的预期。该设置假定，CEO是从一个劳动力池中随机抽取的，劳动力池中包括那些看重职业前景（高类型）或不看重职业前景（低类型）的候选人。对解雇和职业受损的恐惧意味着高类型相比于低类型倾向于更少的机会主义，而低类型会为了个人利益而转移组织资源。与信任和脆弱性相辅相成的观点相反，我确定了TATT和最优成本正式控制是互补的条件。但我也在同样的设定中表明，TATT和最优正式控制可以相互替代。这一结果也解释了为什么高水平的TATT可能不会受到外部审计师或某些利益相关者的欢迎，并解释了模棱两可的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案报告。

Informal tone at the top (TATT) is widely regarded as a fundamental ingredient of organizational control, yet because of its soft nature, the scholarship on TATT has not emphasized mathematical modeling. Observing that TATT refers to the example set by top management, I model TATT as, ceteris paribus, reflecting the expectation that the chief executive officer (CEO) will not divert organizational resources for personal benefit. The setting assumes that CEOs are randomly drawn from a labor pool containing candidates who either value career prospects (high type) or who do not value career prospects (low type). The fear of dismissal and a damaged career mean that high types tend to be less opportunistic than low types, who divert for personal gain. Contrary to the belief that trust and vulnerability go hand in hand, I identify conditions where TATT and optimal costly formal controls are complements. But I also show in the same setting that TATT and optimal formal controls can be substitutes. The results also explain why high levels of TATT may not be welcomed by the external auditor or certain stakeholders and explain ambiguous Sarbanes-Oxley reports.

参考文献：Mark Penno (2021) A Theory of Assurance: Balancing Costly Formal Control with Tone at the Top. Management Science 68(1):654-668.

33、边缘对冲：参数化货币叠加

我们提出了一种利用货币价值、套利和动量来代理预期货币收益的全球股票投资者最优货币对冲策略。一个基准风险约束保证了叠加（overlay）紧密地模仿一个完全对冲的投资组合。我们将此与naïve对冲和替代性对冲进行了严格的样本外检验，并考虑了交易和再平衡成本以及保证金要求。其他套期保值方法通常会降低风险，但会付出代价。有的倾向于高回报的短期货币，而所有的货币都会在摩擦中产生大量的成本，主要是保证金要求和股权再平衡成本。本文提出的策略使用可预测的回报来降低这种成本。与完全对冲基准相比，Sharpe率增长17%，年化Jensen-α增长0.93%。值得注意的是，无论如何，该策略的大部分实施成本都将由基准承担。这降低了其边际成本，并凸显了套期保值与投机整合的特定协同作用。

We propose an optimal currency hedging strategy for global equity investors using currency value, carry, and momentum to proxy for expected currency returns. A benchmark risk constraint ensures the overlay closely mimics a fully hedged portfolio. We compare this with naïve and alternative hedges in a demanding out-of-sample test, with transaction and rebalancing costs and margin requirements. Other hedging methods generally reduce risk but at a cost. Some tend to short currencies with high returns and all incur substantial costs with frictions, mostly margin requirements and equity rebalancing costs. The proposed strategy uses predictable returns to reduce this cost. It produces a statistically significant 17% gain in Sharpe ratio and an annualized Jensen-α of 0.93% versus a fully hedged benchmark. Notably, most of the implementation costs of the strategy would be incurred by the benchmark anyway. This reduces its marginal cost and highlights a specific synergy of integrating hedging with speculation.

参考文献：Pedro Barroso, Jurij-Andrei Reichenecker, Marco J. Menichetti (2021) Hedging with an Edge: Parametric Currency Overlay. Management Science 68(1):669-689.

34、具有许多大模型的投资组合选择

本文提出了一种具有许多大模型的贝叶斯平均异质向量自回归投资组合选择策略，在众多日、周、月数据集上的样本外表现优于现有方法。该战略假设超额收益大致由一个带有大量解释变量的随时间变化的回归决定，这些解释变量是过去收益的样本平均。投资者通过跟踪许多模型来考虑每个时期都有机制变化的可能性，但怀疑是否有任何规范能够完美地预测未来收益的分布，并计算出对模型错误规范具有鲁棒性的投资组合选择。

This paper proposes a Bayesian-averaging heterogeneous vector autoregressive portfolio choice strategy with many big models that outperforms existing methods out-of-sample on numerous daily, weekly, and monthly datasets. The strategy assumes that excess returns are approximately determined by a time-varying regression with a large number of explanatory variables that are the sample means of past returns. Investors consider the possibility that every period there is a regime change by keeping track of many models, but doubt that any specification is able to perfectly predict the distribution of future returns, and compute portfolio choices that are robust to model misspecification.

参考文献：Evan Anderson, Ai-ru (Meg) Cheng (2021) Portfolio Choices with Many Big Models. Management Science 68(1):690-715.

35、过去不成功的回购对未来回购决策的影响

我们发现，当管理者在过去的股票回购中亏损时，他们回购股票的可能性较小，但没有发现有力的证据表明过去的回购收益会影响未来的回购活动。这种不对称的敏感性对于年轻的CEO和任期最短的CEO来说最为强烈。另外，对于之前在股市经历不利的 CEO，未来的回购对过去的回购损失更为敏感。未来回购对过去损失的敏感性平均每年使公司损失约 3.7%。当这一成本被分解为系统性和特异性的部分时，我们发现近一半（1.8%）来自于对特异性冲击的错误判断。过去的回购损失对CEO未来的奖金有显著的负面影响，并增加了未来CEO非自愿离职的可能性。我们还发现，过去回购的负面结果鼓励了随后的股息使用。我们的研究结果表明，过去回购的结果通过非行为（职业关注）和行为（蛇咬效应）因素产生了重大的经济后果。

We find that managers are less likely to repurchase stocks when they lose money on past stock repurchases but find no robust evidence that past gains on repurchases influence future repurchasing activity. This asymmetric sensitivity is strongest for young CEOs and those with the shortest tenure. Also, future repurchases are more sensitive to past repurchase losses for CEOs whose previous lifetime experience with the stock market is unfavorable. The sensitivity of future repurchases to past losses costs firms, on average, about 3.7% per year. When this cost is decomposed into systematic and idiosyncratic components, we find that nearly half (1.8%) comes from mistiming idiosyncratic shocks. Past losses on repurchases have a significant and negative impact on the CEO’s future bonus and increase the likelihood that future CEO termination is involuntary. We also find that negative outcomes from past repurchases encourage the subsequent use of dividends. Our findings suggest that outcomes of past repurchases have economically significant consequences through both nonbehavioral (career concerns) and behavioral (snakebite effect) factors.

参考文献：Geoffrey C. Friesen, Noel Pavel Jeutang, Emre Unlu (2021) The Effect of Unsuccessful Past Repurchases on Future Repurchasing Decisions. Management Science 68(1):716-739.

36、消亡的传染扩散

我们研究了在不完全信息下的多企业均衡中的违约问题。违约与公司的资产负债表和汇总一致。研究结果表明，随着经济中企业数量的增加，其他企业冲击所产生的债务和股权的内生波动性和跳跃幅度消失。因此，信用利差仅渐近依赖于企业自身的现金流风险。本文研究得到的传染扩散消失的结果，对最近基于生产经济的研究结果提出了质疑，在这些研究中，风险数量（证券的波动率和跳跃幅度）是外生给定的，这使得信用利差主要归因于传染。

We study default in a multifirm equilibrium setting with incomplete information. Defaults are consistent with the firm’s balance sheet and aggregation. We show that the endogenous volatility and jump size of debt and equity generated by other firms’ shocks vanish as the number of firms in the economy increases. As a result, credit spreads depend asymptotically only on the firms’ own cash flow risk. Our vanishing contagion spread result calls into question recent findings based on production economies, in which quantities of risk (volatilities and jump sizes of securities) are specified exogenously, that attribute credit spreads mostly to contagion.

参考文献：Diogo Duarte, Rodolfo Prieto, Marcel Rindisbacher, Yuri F. Saporito (2021) Vanishing Contagion Spreads. Management Science 68(1):740-772.

37、投资者情绪和股票期权行权条款

利用行权条款的细节信息，我们证实了在投资者情绪高涨时期授予的股票期权往往具有较短的行权期和持续时间，并且相对于情绪低落时期，其更有可能完全行权或在授予日期后一年内行权的部分明显增多。我们进一步发现，当公司主要由投资期限较短的投资者（例如，临时机构）持有时，情绪对行权条款的影响更为明显。此外，在情绪高涨时期，短期行权条款与未来的并购活动和资本支出呈正相关。总体而言，我们的研究结果与理论预测一致，即在投机市场中，股东用短期导向的薪酬合同来激励经理人，以促使经理人采取维持过高估值的行动。

Using the details of vesting terms, we document that stock options granted in high-investor-sentiment periods tend to have shorter vesting periods and durations and are more likely to vest completely or have a significantly larger fraction vested within one year of the grant date, relative to low-sentiment periods. We further find that the sentiment effect on vesting terms is more pronounced when firms are largely held by investors with short investment horizons (e.g., transient institutions). Moreover, short vesting terms in high-sentiment periods are positively associated with future mergers-and-acquisitions activity and capital expenditures. Overall, our findings are consistent with theoretical predictions that, in a speculative market, shareholders incentivize managers with short-term-oriented compensation contracts to induce managers to pursue actions maintaining overvaluation.

参考文献：Shawn X. Huang, Sami Keskek, Juan Manuel Sanchez (2021) Investor Sentiment and Stock Option Vesting Terms. Management Science 68(1):773-795.

38、关于 "激励持续努力的最优合同 "的评论

在这篇评论中，我们首先用一个反例来证明论文（[Sun P， Tian F (2018) Optimal contract to induce continued effort. Management Sci. 64(9):4193–4217]）第 4节中提出的最优合同结构在两个参与者的贴现率不同时可能是错误的。之后我们给出正确的最优合同结构，这包括泛化合同空间以允许随机终止。在广泛的模型参数下的数值实验表明，这种随机终止在最优合同中很少发生。此外，通过最优合同相对于无随机终止的最好合同的相对改进程度来衡量的次优差距是非常小的。

In this comment, we first use a counterexample to demonstrate that the optimal contract structure proposed in section 4 of the paper [Sun P, Tian F (2018) Optimal contract to induce continued effort. Management Sci. 64(9):4193–4217] can be wrong when the two players’ discount rates are different. We then specify correct optimal contract structures, which involve generalizing the contract space to allow random termination. Numerical study with a wide range of model parameters illustrates that such a random termination only occurs sparingly in optimal contracts. Moreover, the suboptimality gap, measured by the relative improvement of the optimal contract over the best contract without random termination, is extremely small.

参考文献：Ping Cao, Feng Tian, Peng Sun (2021) Comment on “Optimal Contract to Induce Continued Effort”. Management Science 68(1):796-808.