双重股权公司中双重身份高管的薪酬安排——激励还是自利？
《上海财经大学学报》 2021年23卷第1期 页码：91 - 106 online：2021年1月23日
双重股权公司中双重身份高管的薪酬安排——激励还是自利？
Salary Arrangement of Dual Status Executives in Dual Class Share Companies: Incentive or Self-interest?
作者（中）：杜媛1, 2, 3, 徐晴1, 贾凡胜1
作者（英）：Du Yuan1, 2, 3, Xu Qing1, Jia Fansheng1
作者单位：1.中国海洋大学 管理学院，山东 青岛 266100 2.中国海洋大学 中国企业营运资金管理研究中心，山东 青岛 266100 3.中国海洋大学 中国混合所有制改革与资本管理研究院，山东 青岛 266100
摘要：双重股权结构能够使内部股东或创始股东以少数资本投入（现金流权）获得多数投票权（控制权），成为控股股东，由此帮助创始人在不丢失控制权的前提下实现股权融资。文章以双重股权公司中双重身份高管的薪酬为研究对象，考察高投票权股东兼任高管时的薪酬安排、激励效应及其保障机制。文章以2008-2017年的美国上市公司为样本，研究发现：相对于同股同权公司，双重股权公司高管薪酬存在高货币性薪酬、低股票期权的独特现象；双重身份高管可能出于自利动机而制定高货币性薪酬，故难以形成有效激励，而股票期权则能通过激励高投票权股东积极投入其异质性资本以提升企业绩效。因此，外部同股同权股东应更多关注双重股权公司的高管薪酬结构，监管方应要求双重股权公司加强高管薪酬信息披露和公司治理。
关键词：高投票权股东; 高管薪酬; 双重股权公司; 货币性薪酬; 股票期权
Summary: The dual class share structure can help internal shareholders or founding shareholders obtain majority voting rights（control rights）with a small number of capital investment（cash flow rights）, and become the controlling shareholders; it can help founders realize equity financing without losing control. The introduction of dual class share structure is an important measure in Chinese capital market reform, but the institutional arrangement of the same share with different rights has caused great controversy in many countries that have implemented it. Because of the demand for practical experience of dual class share companies and the shortage of existing empirical samples, this paper takes American listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as samples to investigate the problems of dual class share companies exposed in the relatively perfect market environment and relatively loose regulatory environment in the United States. These problems will become the focus of dual class share system reform in China’s transitional capital market. The core research issues of this paper are the special salary arrangement, incentive effect, effective or invalid reasons and corresponding security mechanism when high-voting shareholders are also executives in dual class share companies. It is found that compared with the one-share-one-vote company, the executive compensation of dual class share company has the unique phenomenon of high monetary compensation and low stock option. Further research finds that: The high monetary compensation of dual class share companies does not effectively improve corporate performance, but exposes the self-interest of executives; while stock option weakens the agency problem, compensates for the low claim of high-voting shareholders, and promotes corporate performance by stimulating heterogeneous capital investment of high-voting shareholders. The reason is that under different ownership structure and power structure, the role and path of monetary and equity executive compensation on enterprise performance are different. This study explores the new meaning of executive compensation as an alternative mechanism of claim under the dual class share structure and the meaning of the high-voting shareholders having two sides. Therefore, it is suggested that the external shareholders with one-share-one-vote should pay attention to the executive compensation structure of dual class share companies, especially the compensation design of high-voting shareholders; the regulators should require the dual class share companies to strengthen the information disclosure of executive compensation, improve the requirements of corporate governance, and limit the multiple rights of one share.
Key words: high-voting shareholders; executive compensation; dual class share company; monetary compensation; stock options
DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2021.01.007
收稿日期：2020-7-5
基金项目：国家社会科学基金“基于利益相关者集体选择的中国双重股权结构研究”（16BGL076）
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