金融科技会诱发企业超额银行借款吗？——基于央行金融科技应用试点政策的准自然实验

金融科技会诱发企业超额银行借款吗？——基于央行金融科技应用试点政策的准自然实验

Will Fintech Induce Excess Bank Loans? A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Central Bank’s Pilot Policies on Fintech Applications

《财经研究》2024年50卷第2期 页码：47-62 online：2024年2月3日

作者

中：陈克兢1 , 甄嘉华1 , 熊熊2,3 , 张维2,3

英：Chen Kejing1, Zhen Jiahua1, Xiong Xiong2,3, Zhang Wei2,3

作者单位：1. 东北财经大学 会计学院，辽宁 大连 116025; 2. 天津大学 复杂管理系统实验室，天津 300072; 3. 天津大学 管理与经济学部，天津 300072

摘要及关键词

摘要：作为现代信息技术驱动的金融创新，金融科技给银行等传统金融机构带来了冲击。文章以2016—2021年沪深A股上市公司为样本，探讨了金融科技对企业超额银行借款的影响。研究发现，金融科技会诱发超额银行借款。金融科技所带来的银行业竞争会导致银行为争抢客户资源而过度放贷，使得业绩较差的企业有机会获得超出最优债务规模的银行借款。这种影响在股东与债权人代理冲突严重或者经理人自利严重的企业中更加显著。经济后果分析表明，金融科技所诱发的超额银行借款会增加企业债务违约风险。文章从金融科技的视角探究了银行资金配置效率的影响因素，丰富了金融科技微观经济后果的研究，为防范金融风险提供了经验证据和政策启示。

关键词：金融科技；超额银行借款；银行业竞争；委托代理冲突

Summary: Fintech, as a technology-driven financial innovation, serves as a crucial engine for deepening the structural reform of the financial supply side and enhancing the capacity of financial services for the real economy. Relying on China’s extensive experience in the long-term reform and opening up, regulatory authorities often create a favorable environment for the innovative transformation of new financial models through a “pilot and fault-tolerance” approach. This provides robust theoretical support and inspirations for the exploration of a series of issues triggered by the interplay between “Fintech” and “capital allocation efficiency”. Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2016 to 2021 as the sample, this paper examines the impact of Fintech on firms’ excess bank loans. The results reveal that Fintech can induce excess bank loans. The intensification of competition in the financial industry due to Fintech exacerbates banks’ tendency to over-lend, leading to firms obtaining excess bank loans. In terms of the flow of credit funds, Fintech indeed enables less profitable and financially distressed firms to secure excess bank loans. In firms with severe conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors or significant managerial opportunism, the impact of Fintech on firms’ excess bank loans is more pronounced. Economic consequence analysis indicates that Fintech-induced excess bank loans elevate the risk of corporate debt default. This paper takes excess bank loans by firms as its entry point, extending the economic consequences of Fintech to the micro level of firms and enriching the existing literature on Fintech. Meanwhile, it effectively solves the endogeneity problems in existing Fintech research by leveraging the exogenous impact of pilot policies for Fintech applications, providing useful references for subsequent research on the economic consequences of Fintech. This paper provides empirical evidence and policy implications for preventing financial risks. On the one hand, government authorities should strengthen the construction of financial infrastructure and improve the level of macro prudential supervision, so as to prevent financial risks that may be caused by Fintech. On the other hand, financial institutions should strengthen the credit supervision on firms with severe shareholder-creditor agency conflicts and managerial opportunism, so as to prevent insiders from seeking personal gains through the convenience brought by Fintech for corporate financing.

Key words: Fintech; excess bank loans; banking competition; principal-agent conflicts

其他信息

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20231121.103

收稿日期：2023-06-16

基金项目：国家社会科学基金项目“公司章程自治性条款识别、经济后果及治理机制研究”（23BGL114）；国家自然科学基金专项项目“基于中国‘实体经济—金融系统’复杂关联的计算实验建模研究”（72141304）；教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“中小投资者保护制度创新与资本市场信息效率研究：基于投服中心行权的经验证据”（22YJA630006）；科技部重点研发项目“基于市场行为提取特征及信息经济学的智能化仿真系统”（2022YFC3303304）

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